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DO COURTS CHANGE POLITICS? HELLER AND THE LIMITS 
OF POLICY FEEDBACK EFFECTS 
Kristin A. Goss* 
Matthew J. Lacombe** 
ABSTRACT 
District of Columbia v. Heller was a landmark ruling in which the Supreme 
Court established that citizens have a constitutional right to possess firearms in 
their homes for self-protection. The 5-4 decision—along with the Court’s 
subsequent ruling in McDonald v. Chicago—upended the prevailing wisdom 
that the Second Amendment protected the right of the states to assemble militias 
for collective security. In this Article, we examine the effects of these rulings on 
gun regulation in the United States and, more to the point, on gun politics. We 
situate our analysis within several related theoretical frameworks, most notably 
those focused on policy feedback and on the role of courts in producing social 
change. We argue that the effects of Heller (together with the parallel decision 
in McDonald) have been rather limited. We examine the rulings’ first-order 
effects on pre-existing gun control laws, as well as second-order effects on a 
number of related outcomes. We find that Heller and its progeny have had 
generally small or non-existent impacts on gun policy, on the organizational 
capacities and political strategies of pro-gun and pro-regulation groups, and on 
public attitudes toward gun regulation. Our findings support a constrained view 
of the Court’s ability to drive social and political change. We conclude, 
however, by noting that recent developments—particularly hints that some 
Supreme Court Justices are eager to develop Second Amendment 
jurisprudence—have the potential to alter these conclusions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its landmark ruling 
in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 The ruling struck down several of the city’s 
strict gun laws, including an effective ban on possession of functional 
handguns.2 For the first time, the Court ruled that citizens have a constitutional 
right to possess such a firearm in the home for self-protection.3 The Court 
majority cautioned that the Second Amendment, like other constitutional rights, 
is not unlimited.4 But the 5-4 decision upended the prevailing wisdom that the 
Second Amendment only protected the right of the states to assemble militias 
for collective security.5 In doing so, the ruling endorsed a perspective on guns 
and citizenship that legal scholars (including some liberals) and pro-gun 
advocates had been developing for many years.6  
In the contentious world of gun politics, Heller was a momentous ruling. 
Pundits on all sides of the gun debate rushed to weigh in. Wayne LaPierre, Chief 
Executive of the National Rifle Association (NRA), called the decision “a great 
moment in American history.”7 Ironically, the nation’s largest gun rights 
organization had declined to bring the lawsuit that resulted in the Heller 
decision; the organization’s reluctance stemmed in part from a lack of certainty 
that it would prevail.8 Aside from the strategic desire to avoid a legal loss, 
however, the NRA may also have had a political desire to avoid a win in front 
of the country’s highest court.9 After all, the organization’s ability to mobilize 
its members into politics had relied on claims that gun rights were threatened 
with extinction.10 Such appeals may have lost credibility if the Court chose to 
protect an individual constitutional right to own guns.11 Nevertheless, even 
 
 1 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. at 636. 
 4 Id. at 626–27. 
 5 ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 95–97, 105–
13 (2011). 
 6 DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 118–19 (2016); WINKLER, supra note 5, at 105–13. 
 7 Heller: The Supreme Decision, NRA-ILA (June 27, 2008), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20080627/ 
heller. 
 8 WINKLER, supra note 5, at 56–58, 60 (noting that the NRA brought a parallel lawsuit pursuing what 
the organization saw as a safer legal strategy). 
 9 Id. at 57.  
 10 Id. at 57–58. 
 11 Id. at 58. 
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though it had not brought the lawsuit, the NRA was publicly happy to embrace 
the Heller ruling.12 
Less pleased were political leaders favoring stricter gun laws. For example, 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley called Heller “a very frightening decision.”13 In 
1982, Chicago had instituted a “freeze” on civilian handgun possession, 
meaning that people wishing to acquire and possess a handgun thereafter were 
effectively barred from doing so. In addition, several Chicago suburbs had 
banned handguns. Daley’s comment turned out to be prescient. Two years later, 
using Heller as precedent, an equally divided Supreme Court ruled these policies 
unconstitutional in the case of McDonald v. City of Chicago.14  
While the NRA rejoiced, and Mayor Daley feared the worst, longtime gun 
control advocacy groups glimpsed a silver lining amid the clouds.15 To their eye, 
the Court had signaled that virtually all common gun restrictions would still pass 
constitutional muster.16 What is more, by reinforcing that the Constitution 
protected gun owners, the Court might have deflated the gun rights lobby’s 
argument that any new gun law could result in firearms confiscation and open 
the door to tyranny.17 By undermining the “slippery slope” narrative, some gun 
control advocates thought, the Court might have created space for bipartisan 
compromise on firearms policy.18 As the chief of the Brady Campaign to Prevent 
Gun Violence put it, “[t]he Court . . . rejected the absolutist meaning of the 2nd 
Amendment. [Gun restrictions] can now be debated on their merits without 
distractions of fear or ideology.”19  
Each of these perspectivesfrom a gun rights lobbyist, an anti-gun 
politician, and a gun control organizationserves as a hypothesis for the 
question at hand: What did Heller do? The array of viewpoints described above 
highlights both the importance of understanding the ruling’s downstream effects 
 
 12 See Heller: The Supreme Decision, supra note 7 (publicly supporting the Heller ruling). 
 13 Alex Altman, The Future of Gun Control, TIME (June 26, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/nation/ 
article/0,8599,1818325,00.html. 
 14 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 15 Chris Good, Interview: Brady Campaign President Paul Helmke on Why the Gun Ruling Isn’t So Bad, 
ATLANTIC (June 28, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/interview-brady-campaign-
president-paul-helmke-on-why-the-gun-ruling-isnt-so-bad/58849/ (explaining that the McDonald ruling was a 
very narrow ruling). 
 16 See id.; Altman, supra note 13. 
 17 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 13. 
 18 Paul Helmke, My Formal Statement in the Heller DC Gun Case, Plus Remarks in Front of the Supreme 
Court, HUFFPOST. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/my-formal-statement-on-to_b_109492 (last updated Dec. 6, 
2017). 
 19 Id. 
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and the lack of obvious expectations about what these effects might be. In this 
Article, we assemble a wide range of empirical evidence to examine the ruling’s 
impact on firearm laws and on elite- and mass-level gun politics. We situate our 
analysis within a number of related theoretical frameworks, most notably those 
focused on policy feedback and on the courts as engines of political change.  
We argue that the effects of Heller (together with the parallel decision in 
McDonald) have, in general, been rather limited. We examine the ruling’s first-
order effects on preexisting gun control laws, as well as its second-order effects 
on a number of related outcomes. We find that the ruling has had generally small 
or nonexistent impacts on gun policy, legislative agendas, the organizational 
capacities and political strategies of pro-gun and pro-regulation groups, and 
public attitudes about gun regulation. Our findings support a constrained view 
of the Court’s ability to drive social and political change. We conclude, however, 
by noting that recent developments have the potential to alter our conclusions 
moving forward.  
I. THE (HOLLOW?) HOPE: GUN RIGHTS, FEEDBACK EFFECTS ON POLITICS, 
AND THE CONSTRAINED COURT 
In the context of constitutional jurisprudence, court rulings are tantamount 
to statements of public policy. As such, they might be expected to have what we 
will call first-order and second-order effects on policymaking and politics. First-
order effects can be thought of as the direct and foreseeable impacts of a ruling 
on public policy. They might include the repeal or revision of unconstitutional 
statutes or regulations; state imposition of incentives or costs to induce 
compliance with the court ruling; and changes in social or economic behavior in 
response to the ruling.20 These are the conventional ways that court rulings are 
understood to have influence—as striking down (or upholding) laws and 
reordering (or not) state and social practices associated with these laws.21  
But court rulings as statements of public policy might have second-order 
effects, as wellnamely, on the political dynamics surrounding the issue at 
hand.22 Such impacts are known as “policy feedback” effects.23 Feedback theory 
 
 20 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9–36 
(1991). See generally R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994). 
 21 ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 9–36. 
 22 See Suzanne Mettler & Mallory SoRelle, Policy Feedback Theory, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY 
PROCESS 103–34 (Christopher M. Weibe & Paul A. Sabatier eds., 4th ed. 2018); Paul Pierson, When Effect 
Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD POL. 595, 599 (1993). 
 23 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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holds that policies may affect citizens’ political capacity, their stake in defending 
or challenging the state, and their sense of civic inclusion or status.24 Policies 
may also operate through political organizations, shaping their capacity to 
mediate between the state and the citizenry.25 For example, policies may support 
organizations in their roles as incubators of civic skills, as fora for civic 
inclusion, as arenas for political recruitment, as amplifiers of political influence, 
and as mobilizers of collective action. Policies may work on organizations to 
frustrate these goals, as well.26 Finally, policies may have feedback effects on 
political elites, who learn from public policy and make decisions based on this 
learning.27  
While most policy feedback work emphasizes positive cycles, whereby 
policy shapes subsequent political attitudes and behaviors, feedback effects do 
not occur in all cases and are often contingent on particular conditions being 
met.28 In some cases, policies can even produce negative feedback, in which 
 
 24 See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); ANDREA LOUISE 
CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 
(2003); AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014); SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE 
MAKING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION (2005); SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); DEONDRA ROSE, CITIZENS BY DEGREE: 
HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY AND THE CHANGING GENDER DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2018); E. E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF (1935); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS 
AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 58–59 (1992); Mettler & 
SoRelle, supra note 22, at 103–34; Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policy for 
Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 60 (2004); Pierson, 
supra note 22, at 599; Anne Schneider & Helen Ingram, The Social Construction of Target Populations: 
Implications for Politics and Policy, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 334, 338–39 (1993); Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare: 
Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 363, 364 (1999). 
 25 See generally IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND 
REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 161–88 (2006); KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE PARADOX OF GENDER 
EQUALITY: HOW AMERICAN WOMEN’S GROUPS GAINED AND LOST THEIR PUBLIC VOICE (2012); CHLOE N. 
THURSTON, AT THE BOUNDARIES OF HOME OWNERSHIP: CREDIT, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE AMERICAN STATE 
(2018); JACK L. WALKER JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS (1991); Kristin A. Goss, Civil Society and Civic Engagement: Toward a Multilevel Theory of 
Policy Feedbacks, 6 J. CIV. SOC’Y 119, 123 (2010); Kristin A. Goss, Carolyn Barnes & Deondra Rose, Bringing 
Organizations Back In: MultiLevel Feedback Effects on Individual Civic Inclusion, 47 POL’Y STUD. J. 451, 452 
(2019); Matthew Lacombe, Gunning for the Masses: How the NRA Has Shaped Its Supporters’ Behavior, 
Advanced Its Political Agenda, and Thwarted the Will of the Majority (Mar. 2019) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author). 
 26 Goss, Barnes & Rose, supra note 25, at 463. 
 27 Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 288–90 (1993); 
Pierson, supra note 24, at 610. See generally HUGH HECLO, MODERN SOCIAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN 
(1974). 
 28 Daniel J. Galvin & Chloe N. Thurston, The Democrats’ Misplaced Faith in Policy Feedback, 15 
FORUM 333, 334–35 (2017); see also Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform as 
Policy Feedback, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111, 114 (2007); Soss, supra note 24, at 376. See generally METTLER, 
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policies contain self-undermining features that contribute to their own demise.29 
These findings suggest that even major policies may not produce significant and 
durable political effects.  
Whether examining the mass, organizational, or elite level, policy feedback 
theory predicts that policies have the potential to reshape politics. Policy 
feedback constitutes a growing area of inquiry among social scientists.30 
Interestingly, however, feedback theory has developed almost exclusively 
through studies of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies developed 
by legislatures and implemented by executive agencies and their nonprofit 
contractors and grantees.31 There has been very little thought given to the courts 
as producers of public policy with the potential to produce feedback effects on 
politics. 
An early and prominent exception is the work of Gerald Rosenberg.32 His 
important book The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? was 
published just as political science was rediscovering early insights about 
policy’s effects on politics,33 organizing these works under the rubric of policy 
feedback, and building a new body of work. Without using the term “feedback 
effects,” Rosenberg was adding to this literature.  
Particularly relevant for our purposes, Rosenberg explores whether the 
seminal Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education altered the 
politics of civil rights in America.34 Rosenberg’s primary concern is with the 
ruling’s first-order effects—whether Brown desegregated the public schools.35 
Finding no evidence that it did, Rosenberg asks whether the ruling might have 
produced second-order, political impacts of the sort that scholars now term 
 
supra note 24. 
 29 ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY REFORMS ARE 
ENACTED 2–3, 32 (2008); Alan M. Jacobs & R. Kent Weaver, When Policies Undo Themselves: Self-
Undermining Feedback as a Source of Policy Change, 28 GOVERNANCE 441, 443 (2015); Eric M. Patashnik, 
Limiting Policy Backlash: Strategies for Taming Countercoalitions in an Era of Polarization, 685 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 48 (2019); Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, The Struggle to Remake Politics: 
Liberal Reform and the Limits of Policy Feedback in the Contemporary American State, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 
1071, 1072, 1077, 1083 (2013).  
 30 Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at 104. 
 31 See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 98; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24; Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 
24. 
 32 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 33 See, e.g., SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 24, at 283; Theodore J. Lowi, American Business, Public 
Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 677 (1964). 
 34 ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 40. 
 35 Id. at 39–54. 
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policy feedback effects.36 He explores a number of logical possibilities, 
including a boost to the civil rights movement,37 increases in African-American 
voter registration, a rise in civil rights bills and co-sponsorships citing the 
ruling,38 reductions in racist attitudes among the general public,39 changes in 
textbooks’ portrayals of African-Americans,40 and so forth. Again, the data show 
few if any such effects.41 Put in terms of feedback theory, he reached a series of 
null findings.  
Rosenberg sees these findings as evidence for the “constrained court” view 
of the judiciary’s influence.42 In this view, courts in and of themselves are 
seldom agents of social change.43 The constrained court perspective stands in 
contrast to the “dynamic court” view, which places more faith in courts’ 
influence.44 The constrained court perspective finds support in Federalist 78, in 
which Alexander Hamilton argued that the Supreme Court’s impact would be 
limited because it had neither the sword—that is, authority to enforce 
implementation of its rulings—nor the purse—that is, financial resources to 
encourage compliance.45 Rosenberg returns to these insights to argue that 
interest groups and social movements expect too much from the Court and that, 
indeed, such contemporary expectations are historically “odd.”46 Stating that 
courts provide a “hollow hope” to reformers, Rosenberg argues that “[w]hat is 
radical is the belief that litigation can produce significant social reform, that 
rights triumph over politics.”47 Rosenberg concedes that the Court can facilitate 
significant reform under certain conditions,48 but his analysis casts doubt on the 
capacity of rulings to produce substantial change on their own.  
Drawing on Rosenberg’s approach and policy feedback theory more 
broadly, we assess whether Heller and its progeny had political or policy impacts 
beyond the first-order, geographically delineated effects on the specific types of 
laws implicated in the rulings. We investigate effects in three broad categories: 
(1) laws and other indicators of policymakers’ agendas; (2) the political capacity 
 
 36 Id. at 40–41. 
 37 Id. at 131–56. 
 38 Id. at 124. 
 39 Id. at 125–31. 
 40 Id. at 116. 
 41 Id. at 155. 
 42 Id. at 157. 
 43 Id. at 10. 
 44 Id. at 22. 
 45 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 46 ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 430. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 431. 
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and strategies of advocacy organizations; and (3) mass attitudes. With one 
exception, we find that these decisions had somewhere between minimal and no 
effects. The exception is that Heller and its progeny led gun groups to increase 
their use of litigation (largely unsuccessfully) to achieve legal and social change. 
Viewed as a whole, the evidence presented here suggests that roughly a decade 
after they were decided, Heller and its progeny have delivered more symbolic 
assurances than tangible outcomes.  
II. WHAT DID HELLER DO? THE RULING’S DIRECT EFFECTS ON LAW 
AND POLICY 
Heller was the first Supreme Court ruling to find a constitutional protection 
for private gun ownership.49 It invalidated several District of Columbia gun laws 
that, combined, effectively prohibited the possession of a functional firearm in 
the home.50 Under the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, the District 
barred the possession, sale, or transfer of handguns, except those that had been 
registered before the law went into effect (September 24, 1976) and then 
reregistered within sixty days thereafter.51 Under the law, any firearm kept at 
home, including long guns, had to be stored unloaded and disassembled or 
secured by a trigger lock.52 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia 
found that these laws violated the Second Amendment,53 which reads, “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”54 Drawing on seventeenth 
and eighteenth century English history, early state right-to-bear-arms provisions, 
and eighteenth century semantic conventions, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
founders understood the amendment to enshrine a broad right of self-defense, 
irrespective of people’s service in the militia.55 The ruling established the core 
legal principles and an ambiguous framework for evaluating Second 
Amendment challenges to American gun laws at the local, state, and federal 
levels.56  
 
 49 Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership, WASH. POST (June 27, 2008), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/26/AR2008062600615.html. 
 50 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008). 
 51 Edward D. Jones III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975”: The 
Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States—or Is It?, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 
139 (1981). The Act became D.C. Law 1-85. Id. 
 52 Id. at 140. 
 53 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 55 Heller, 554 U.S. at 606–11. 
 56 See Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the court’s Second Amendment 
analysis is “is framed by a two-step inquiry established in Heller”); Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory 
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Heller also served as the foundation for a handful of especially salient pro-
gun rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court (McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2010),57 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Moore v. Madigan, 
2012),58 by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Palmer v. 
District of Columbia, 2014),59 and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit (Wrenn v. District of Columbia and Grace v. District of Columbia, both 
in 2017).60 This small handful of rulings had significant but geographically 
limited effects in three areas: Washington, D.C.; Chicago and its environs; and 
certain enclaves of San Francisco. 
Within a few weeks of Heller, the D.C. City Council repealed the District’s 
ban on handguns but passed legislation requiring that firearms be kept locked, 
unloaded, or disassembled unless there was a “threat of immediate harm to a 
person” within the home.61 The storage requirement later was downgraded to a 
recommendation,62 but D.C. gun laws remain among the most restrictive in the 
nation.63 They require that firearms be registered with the police; that the 
registrant not be subject to standard federal prohibitors or have a recent history 
of violent behavior or of firearms negligence causing death or injury; and that 
the registrant take precautions to prevent minors from accessing any loaded 
firearm on the premises.64  
Besides these changes to D.C.’s firearms law, Heller led to the swift repeal 
of handgun bans in four Chicago suburbs—Evanston, Morton Grove, Wilmette, 
and Winnetka—as well as in public housing complexes operated by the City of 
San Francisco.65 Heller also served as a precedent for a second Supreme Court 
case, McDonald v. City of Chicago, which extended Heller’s individual-rights 
holding to jurisdictions beyond the federal capital.66 The ruling struck down 
 
to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1439–
42 (2018). 
 57 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010). 
 58 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 59 Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 178 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 60 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 61 Nikita Stewart & Bill Turque, D.C. Gun Ban Is Out, but Regulations Stay, WASH. POST, July 16, 2008, 
at B1. 
 62 Firearm Registration General Requirements—Study Guide, METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://mpdc.dc. 
gov/page/firearm-registration-general-requirements-study-guide (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 63 District of Columbia Gun Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-
law/district-of-columbia/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 64 Firearm Registration, supra note 62. 
 65 David B. Kopel, Gun Rights and the Constitution: Was Heller Insignificant?, CATO INST. (Mar. 26, 
2009), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/gun-rights-constitution-was-heller-insignificant. 
 66 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20 8/27/2020 5:20 PM 
2020] HELLER AND THE LIMITS OF POLICY FEEDBACK 891 
Chicago’s longstanding handgun freeze.67 A twenty-five-year-old ban on assault 
weapons in Cook County, which includes Chicago and many of its suburbs, 
remains in place.68 The McDonald ruling also led a fifth Chicago suburb, Oak 
Park, to repeal its handgun ban.69  
The precedent set by Heller and reinforced by McDonald extended to three 
especially important rulings at the district court and circuit court levels. In 
Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Illinois’ 
ban on the carrying of concealed firearms in public.70 The law had carved out 
exceptions for certain categories of people (e.g., law enforcement officers, 
hunters, shooting-club members) and for certain locations (e.g., on private 
property, in one’s home, at a fixed place of business).71 But even with these 
provisions, it had been the strictest state law in the nation.72 After Moore, Illinois 
joined the ranks of “shall issue” states, meaning that law enforcement must grant 
concealed carry licenses to people who meet basic legal requirements (e.g., they 
are not disqualified from owning a firearm).73 That said, Illinois law includes a 
process whereby law enforcement officers who fear that an applicant may pose 
a threat to himself or others may take their concerns to a review board, which 
has the power to deem the applicant ineligible to obtain the license.74  
Heller also had an effect on gun laws that the District of Columbia enacted 
to replace the unconstitutional handgun ban. In Palmer v. District of Columbia, 
for example, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia struck 
down the city’s relatively new ban on the carrying of concealed firearms.75 In 
response to the Palmer ruling, the Council amended its concealed-carry law to 
grant licenses to citizens who could demonstrate “good reason” to fear injury to 
themselves or their property, based on “special need” grounded in “specific 
threats or previous attacks.”76 In Wrenn v. District of Columbia (2017) and its 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Jonah Meadows, Cook County Assault Weapons Ban Upheld by Federal Appeals Court, PATCH (Aug. 
30, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://patch.com/10llinois/highlandpark/cook-county-assault-weapons-ban-upheld-
federal-appeals-court. 
 69 Oak Park Gun Laws: Gun Advocates Say Suburb Developing ‘Blueprint’ for Statewide Crackdown, 
HUFFPOST (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:01 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/oak-park-gun-laws-gun-adv_n_1230 
947. 
 70 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 71 Id. at 934. 
 72 Moore v. Madigan: Law Center Files Briefs in Significant Second Amendment Cases, GIFFORDS L. 
CTR. (June 13, 2012), https://lawcenter.giffords.org/tag/moore-v-madigan/. 
 73 Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/10 (West Supp. 2015). 
 74 Firearm Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/20(g) (West 2014). 
 75 Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 183 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 76 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting D.C. Code Ann. § 7-
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companion case, Grace v. District of Columbia (2017), the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals struck down the “good reason” law on the grounds that it effectively 
deprived most residents of their Second Amendment right to carry in self-
defense.77  
To the question, “What did Heller and its progeny do?” the first and most 
direct answer is that they struck down blanket bans on handgun possession and 
carrying in a handful of jurisdictions. However, these bans had always been 
anomalous, representing the far reaches of modern gun control efforts.78 What 
is more, these laws stood out as particularly anachronistic in an era when the 
federal government and many states had been moving for a decade or more to 
deregulate firearms.79 Finally, these laws also had limited reach. The District of 
Columbia, San Francisco, and Illinois are home to about 4–5% of the U.S. 
population,80 and only a fraction of this number would have been directly 
affected by the newly relaxed gun laws (meaning people would now choose to 
exercise Second Amendment rights previously denied to them).81  
Thus, Heller and its progeny had an immediate effect on public policy that 
was real yet quite geographically limited. However, the previously discussed 
theories of public policy—of which court rulings are a form—counsel us to look 
for effects beyond those that are immediately visible.  
III. POLICY FEEDBACK & POLICY LEARNING: EFFECTS ON LAWMAKERS 
Beyond its first-order effects, rulings like Heller may also produce less 
direct, second-order effects that can restructure the political strategies and 
attitudes of lawmakers, advocacy groups, and even the mass public. In this Part, 
 
2059.11(1)(A) (West 2015)).  
 77 Id. at 667; Grace v. District of Columbia, No. 15-2234, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171367, at *2–3 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 17, 2017). 
 78 PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 95 (2014). 
 79 KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 10, 197 
(2006). 
 80 See QuickFacts: United States; District of Columbia; San Francisco City, California; Illinois, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US,DC,sanfranciscocitycalifornia,IL/PST04 
5219 (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 81 See JOHN R. LOTT JR., CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER, CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS 
ACROSS THE UNITED STATES: 2017 29 (2017) (noting that there were 243,254 active concealed carry permits in 
Illinois as of May 31, 2017); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SAN FRANCISCO HOUSING AUTHORITY: FIVE 
YEAR PLAN 2016–2021, at 5 (2013) (noting that there are approximately 6,100 public housing units); District of 
Columbia Gun Laws, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/state-law/district-of-columbia/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (noting that even though handguns are now legal, the licensing requirements remain 
strict). 
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we examine the feedback effects of Heller and progeny on the actions of 
lawmakers.  
If policy has feedback effects on politics, one should expect to detect such 
effects on the behavior of political elites. One such effect is policy learning. As 
formulated by Hugh Heclo, Peter Hall, and Paul Pierson, among others, learning 
typically refers to the process by which policies produce lessons of success and 
failure that shape policymakers’ decisions about how to amend or perhaps 
discard a given law or regulation.82 Although not conventionally part of the 
literature on policy learning, court rulings may offer lessons to policymakers 
about what kinds of policies are possible, desirable, or forbidden. 
What did policymakers learn from Heller? As discussed above, lawmakers 
and implementing agencies in the three affected jurisdictions discarded 
unconstitutional laws or, in most cases, replaced them with regulations believed 
to be in conformity with the courts’ interpretation of the Second Amendment. 
Perhaps a more interesting question is whether, beyond providing policy 
mandates, these rulings provided political lessons to policymakers about new 
possibilities in gun regulation or deregulation. In particular, we ask whether the 
courts liberated lawmakers, particularly pro-gun lawmakers, to dismantle 
regulations that perhaps would not be unconstitutional but that would fit 
uncomfortably in a new legal order providing some deference to individual gun 
rights. 
To evaluate whether Heller and progeny had such a learning effect, we 
assess three hypotheses:  
H1) that lawmakers would cease introducing handgun-ban bills; 
H2) that lawmakers would move to repeal state bans on “junk guns”; 
H3) that lawmakers would enact more gun rights provisions at the state 
level. 
A. State Handgun Ban Proposals 
The Heller Court found that the District of Columbia’s effective ban on 
handguns unconstitutionally infringed individuals’ Second Amendment rights.83 
Although Heller applied only to the District of Columbia, a unique federal 
district, the Court’s holding cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of all such 
 
 82 HECLO, supra note 27, at 306; Hall, supra note 27, at 277–78; Pierson, supra note 24, at 612. 
 83 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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bans nationwide.84 Two years later, the McDonald Court affirmed this 
supposition.85 Thus, if these cases were to have an impact on lawmaker agendas, 
the most direct effect would be on efforts to ban handguns. We would expect to 
see a decrease in handgun-ban bills after 2008, and an even more precipitous 
drop after 2010, as lawmakers learn that such bills would be likely to draw, and 
highly unlikely to survive, a court challenge. 
To assess whether Heller and its progeny affected the agendas of state 
lawmakers, we compiled an original dataset of bills introduced in state 
legislatures to ban handguns.86 We interpreted the term “ban” broadly to include 
blanket bans on handguns (such as S.B. 46, introduced in the Tennessee Senate 
in 1989), on “cop killer” handguns (such as S.B. 2113, introduced in the 
Massachusetts Senate in June 2005), and on guns deemed unsafe (such as A.B. 
2245, introduced in the California State Assembly in February 2016). Figure 1 
shows the number of handgun-ban bills introduced in the eighteen years before 
Heller, in 2008 (when the ruling came down), and in the nine years afterward—
as well as the number of states in which such bills were introduced.  
 
 
 84 COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 95. 
 85 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 86 We compiled these bills from LexisNexis State Capital. We used these search terms: [handgun] AND 
[prohibit OR ban] for the years 1990–2017. (The State Capital database has since migrated to a platform called 
State Net.) The dataset includes bills regarding so-called junk guns or other handguns meeting certain criteria, 
as well as bills seeking a broad handgun ban via other entities (e.g., Congress, state referenda). These are the 
types of “ban” bills that might have been constitutionally suspect under Heller. If we were to see a feedback 
effect, we would expect to see it in the introduction of these types of bills. At the same time, our dataset excluded 
bills that, in our reading of Heller, would have been presumptively constitutional, including bans on possession 
by or transfers to minors, felons, or other generally prohibited people; bans on place-based carry restrictions 
(e.g., schools, bars); bans on undetectable firearms; and bans on more than one handgun purchase per month. 
This data is on file with the author. 
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The Figure is consistent with a slight Heller effect—there are no handgun-
ban bills of any type in the first seven years after the ruling. However, this 
finding must be placed in context: in the two decades prior to Heller, very few 
such bills were introduced (typically 0–3 per year), and then only in a handful 
of states (0–3 states per year, with 11 states represented over the 29-year period). 
These bills constituted either a nonexistent or negligible fraction of legislative 
proposals introduced in any given state in any given year. If Heller reoriented 
lawmakers’ policy agendas, this data series suggests that this reorientation was 
not especially profound. Put simply, state lawmakers introduce thousands of 
bills each year. Handgun ban legislation was so rare by 2008 that with or without 
Heller, its disappearance thereafter might have passed without note. 
B. Junk Gun Bans 
“Junk guns” is a colloquial term used to describe a variety of inexpensive, 
poorly made handguns that may be at elevated risk of misfiring or being used in 
crime.87 These guns, sometimes called Saturday Night Specials, have been 
 
 87 Eva H. Shine, Comment, The Junk Gun Predicament: Answers Do Exist, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183, 1183, 
1185–86 (1998). 
GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20 8/27/2020 5:20 PM 
896 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:881 
targets of state and federal regulation at least since the 1970s.88 The Heller ruling 
did not specifically address the constitutionality of this category of handgun, but 
to pro-gun lawmakers the ruling might have provided a political opening to 
revisit the constitutional status of existing junk-gun bans. 
Using data compiled by Michael Siegel and colleagues at Boston 
University’s School of Public Health, we assembled a time series of state junk-
gun bans from 1991 (eighteen years before Heller) through 2018 (ten years 
after).89 The series shows that within that time frame, the number of states 
having such bans rose from five (1991) to seven (2001), then dropped to six bans 
four years after Heller. The story is similar to that of handgun-ban bills above. 
These laws were rare before Heller and rare afterward. This legislative stasis is 
hard to square with a Heller effect. 
C. Pro-Gun Policies 
The National Rifle Association, the nation’s largest and most politically 
prominent gun rights organization, has long opposed stricter gun laws.90 
However, since the late 1970s, when a hardline faction took over the 
organization’s board, it has developed a strategic approach to relax gun laws on 
both the federal and (especially) state levels.91 The organization has selected a 
handful of top priority policy reforms and, taking advantage of its federated 
structure, gone from state to state to lobby for their enactment.92 Beyond the 
NRA, many states have highly politicized gun rights organizations that are often 
to the right of the NRA and equally capable of mobilizing members for political 
action.93 These forces have traditionally held advantages in many state 
legislatures (which frequently favor rural areas, where many gun owners live) 
and have not been matched by a countermovement of local gun control 
activists.94 
These political dynamics allow us to assess two competing hypotheses. If 
courts have learning effects on policymakers, we might expect the number of 
pro-gun laws to rise in the year or two after Heller. If the courts have no such 
 
 88 See David T. Hardy & John Stompoly, Of Arms and the Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 62, 113 (1974). 
 89 Michael Siegel, State Firearms Laws, ST. FIREARM LAWS DATABASE, http://www.statefirearmlaws. 
org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 90 Lacombe, supra note 25, at 45. 
 91 COOK & GOSS, supra note 78; GOSS, supra note 79. 
 92 COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 193–94, 199–200; ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 
125 (2018). 
 93 COOK & GOSS, supra note 78, at 191–93. 
 94 GOSS, supra note 79, at 172–73. 
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effects, we might expect to see an uninterrupted trend line. Figure 2, compiled 
by Michael Siegel and his colleagues, provides a rough account of the diffusion 
of policies prioritized by pro-gun organizations from 1991 to 2016.95 (Note the 
counts are cumulative in the sense that they represent laws on the books in any 
given year, not laws enacted in any given year.) As the chart shows, the number 
of states with pro-gun provisions had been increasing at a modest and 
occasionally rapid pace before 2008, and this pace did not become visibly more 
rapid after Heller.  
Although these patterns again appear inconsistent with a pronounced Heller 
effect, we offer one caveat. The number of states adopting “permitless concealed 
carry” laws—which allow people entitled to own guns to carry them concealed 
in public without a license—has ticked up in the years since Heller.96 The year 
2009 appeared to be a switch point, albeit a minor one, for permitless carry—
described by gun rights forces as “constitutional carry.” The elimination of 
concealed carry licensing has been a key policy goal of pro-gun organizations 
 
 95 Michael Siegel et al., Firearm-Related Laws in All 50 US States, 1991–2016, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1122, 1127 fig.2 (2017) (adapted and used with permission).  
 96 Permitless Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/10/Permitless-Carry-Factsheet-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
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and the focus of sustained state-level advocacy.97 Heller, which did not deal 
explicitly with carrying but implied that bans would be constitutionally suspect, 
may have encouraged activists to take a more assertive approach to the 
dismantling of license-to-carry laws. However, it may also be the case that the 
timing of permitless carry’s advancement vis-a-vis Heller was coincidental 
insofar as this policy reform represents the logical next step in a long effort to 
deregulate guns in public spaces—an effort that began many years before Heller.  
With some possible modest exceptions, we find that Heller and progeny had 
little direct impact on state gun laws beyond those at issue in the rulings 
themselves. 
IV. POLICY FEEDBACK: EFFECTS ON POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Many of the most important recent works on policy feedback have focused 
on political engagement at the level of the individual, and to a lesser extent, at 
the level of organizations and movements.98 Individuals, organizations, and 
movements are logical places to look for feedback effects in regimes (such as 
the United States) that have decentralized systems of interest group pluralism 
and strong constitutional protections for political speech and association. 
Rosenberg’s case studies, particularly of Brown v. Board of Education, pursued 
this intuition. Here we consider organization-level feedback effects, and in the 
next Section we consider effects at the level of the mass public. 
Both the Heller and McDonald cases inspired a good deal of political 
engagement from organizations and individuals in policy communities 
concerned with gun rights and gun control. In Heller, for example, sixty-seven 
amicus curiae briefs were submitted on behalf of scores of organizations, 
individuals, and networks of experts.99 Advocates for the gun rights position 
(70% of briefs) included gun owner associations, think tanks and litigation 
organizations, the U.S. Vice President and conservative members of Congress, 
certain states, former government officials and military officers, and civil 
liberties groups.100 On the gun regulation or neutral side (30% of briefs) were 
gun control advocacy organizations, cities, liberal members of Congress, civil 
 
 97 Chris W. Cox, Working Together to Save the Second Amendment Part II: State Success Stories, NRA-
ILA (May 21, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190521/working-together-to-save-the-second-amendment-
part-ii-state-success-stories. 
 98 See Andrea Louise Campbell, Policy Makes Mass Politics, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 333, 351 (2012); 
Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at 104; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24, at 60.  
 99 District of Columbia v. Heller Case Files, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
cases/dc-v-heller/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 100 Id. 
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rights groups, academics, lawyers, and pediatricians.101 In short, Heller drew 
broad organizational engagement while under consideration. This level of 
institutional engagement—coupled with the salience of gun violence, gun 
ownership, and the “great American gun war”102—gives us reason to expect that 
Heller and its progeny might produce organization-level feedback effects. We 
assess three hypotheses along these lines: 
H4) that the rulings changed the policy agendas of gun regulation groups; 
H5) that the rulings altered the political strategies of pro-gun groups; 
H6) that the rulings changed the organizational capacity of both pro-gun 
and gun regulation organizations. 
A. Policy Agendas of Gun Regulation Groups: Legislation 
The politics of gun regulation is defined by scores of local, state, and national 
advocacy organizations. Thus, if policy shapes politics, it is logical to look to 
advocacy organizations’ political strategies for evidence of a Heller effect. We 
examine the policy agendas of the three dominant national gun regulation groups 
before and immediately after the two-year span of time encompassing the Heller 
and McDonald rulings.103 These groups are the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns (a precursor to Everytown for Gun Safety), and the 
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence. We assess whether the sorts of 
policies prioritized by these groups changed following Heller and its progeny, 
specifically with regard to policies deemed unconstitutional by the Court.  
We first assessed the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence. Prior to Heller, the 
Coalition emphasized three sets of policy priorities. The first—labeled “Closing 
Illegal Gun Markets”—focused on enacting policies that would make it more 
difficult for individuals prohibited from owning guns to buy them on the 
secondary market.104 Such proposals included extending background checks to 
cover sales made at gun shows, passing gun licensing and registration 
requirements, making it easier to trace guns used in crimes, and banning 
“assault” weapons.105 The second—“International Arms Trade”—focused on 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INT. 37, 37 (1976).  
 103 We used the WayBackMachine Internet Archive, a repository of no-longer-live webpages, to 
reconstruct the pre- and post-Heller agendas of these organizations.  




 105 Id. 
GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20 8/27/2020 5:20 PM 
900 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:881 
preventing the flow of firearms to criminal groups across international 
borders.106 Finally, the third—“Guns, Democracy and Freedom”—was a bit 
broader, but focused on preventing employees from being able to bring guns to 
work, opposing laws giving immunity to gun manufacturers for accidents and 
crimes committed with weapons they produced, and fighting the spread of what 
the Coalition describes as “shoot first laws” (more commonly known as “stand-
your-ground laws”).107 In addition, the “Guns, Democracy, and Freedom” 
initiative included a defense of Washington, D.C.’s gun laws during the period 
in which Heller was pending.108  
To what extent did the Coalition’s policy goals shift after Heller and later 
McDonald? The answer is, not much. In the months after Heller, the Coalition’s 
website listed a broadly similar set of policy priorities, just slightly 
rearranged.109 The group acknowledged the Heller decision and noted that it 
would assist the city with revising its gun laws to be in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s ruling.110 By early 2011—after McDonald—the group’s policy 
priorities still had not shifted substantially.111 The Coalition again acknowledged 
the Court’s decision but did not signal that it would alter its agenda in any way 
as a result.112 The absence of a shift is no doubt due to the fact that the Coalition’s 
pre-2008 priorities were presumptively constitutional even under the Heller 
 








 108 Democracy and DC Gun Laws, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.csgv. 
org/site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2821475/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20080226103545/http://www.csgv.org/ 
site/c.muLYJ7MMKrH/b.2821475/]. 
 109 Issues & Campaigns, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.csgv.org/ 
site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509211/k.AA0C/Issues__Campaigns.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20090412053 
823/http://www.csgv.org/site/c.pmL5JnO7KzE/b.3509211/k.AA0C/Issues__Campaigns.htm]. 




 111 Issues & Campaigns, COALITION TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.csgv.org/issues-
and-campaigns [https://web.archive.org/web/20110203051653/http://www.csgv.org/issues-and-campaigns]. 
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court’s reading of the Second Amendment.113 The Coalition, which was founded 
as the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, had long since ceased advocating 
such a policy goal.114 
We also assessed Mayors Against Illegal Guns, which was founded in 2006 
and held its first summit in April of that year.115 At the summit, hosted by New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Boston Mayor Thomas Menino, the 
assembled mayors established guiding principles for the organization, which 
focused on punishing individuals and gun dealers who “possess, use, and traffic 
in illegal guns,” making it easier for cities to trace guns used in crimes, and 
building collaborations between cities that would assist in these objectives.116 
These priorities indicate that the organization was careful to place its focus 
on illegal guns, and none of the principles advocated for legislation that would 
eventually be precluded by Heller or McDonald. Indeed, in a press release 
following the event, Mayor Bloomberg explicitly stated: “This is not a question 
of ideologies or a referendum on the Second Amendment. This is about public 
safety and making sure that illegal guns never make their way into the hands of 
criminals and onto our streets.”117  
At its 2007 summit in Washington, D.C., the group chose to emphasize the 
importance of the “Tiahrt Amendments,” which have been attached to 
Department of Justice appropriations bills since 2003 and restrict access to 
federal data that may be useful for tracking illegal guns and their dealers.118 The 
featured state and local legislation on the Mayors group’s website as of 2007 did 
not advocate any proposals that would ban weapons and could potentially be 
deemed unconstitutional post-Heller.119  
 
 113 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 114 GOSS, supra note 79, at 153, 197. 
 115 Mayor Bloomberg, Boston Mayor Menino and Mayors from Around the United States Stand Up 
Together in the Fight Against Illegal Guns, OFFICIAL WEBSITE N.Y.C. (Apr. 26, 2006), https://www1.nyc.gov/ 
office-of-the-mayor/news/129-06/mayor-bloomberg-boston-mayor-menino-mayors-around-united-states-
stand-up-together-in#/1. 
 116 Id.; Coalition Principles, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 2, 2007), http:/www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/about/principles.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20070702003247/http:/ 
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/about/principles.shtml]. 
 117 Mayor Bloomberg, supra note 115. 
 118 Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 2, 2007), http:/www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20070702090924/http:// 
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml]. Gun rights advocates view these amendments 
as a way to protect the privacy of gun owners and guard against the creation of a national gun registry. Tiahrt 
Amendments, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/federal-law/other-laws/tiahrt-
amendments/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 119 State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 3, 2007), http://www. 
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Mayors’ agenda had expanded a bit by the post-Heller period, but not in 
ways that seem likely to be related to the ruling. In addition to advocating 
elimination of the Tiahrt Amendments, the organization’s federal legislative 
positions as of December 2008 emphasized expanding background checks, 
precluding individuals on terror watch lists from being allowed to buy guns, 
preventing gun dealers that were being shut down due to illegal sales from being 
able to sell the rest of their inventory, and requiring gun dealers to conduct 
background checks of their employees.120 The organization’s state and local 
priorities at this time focused on requirements to report lost/stolen firearms, 
creation of gun offender registries, establishment of regional gun data-sharing 
programs, and expanded mental health reporting.121 As in prior years, these 
policies focused more on enforcement of existing guns laws than on establishing 
the sorts of gun-ban policies deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
These priorities had not changed in substantial ways by the end of 2011, after 
the McDonald ruling.122  
Finally, we also examined the policy agenda of the Brady Campaign. Prior 
to Heller, Brady emphasized expanding background checks, closing gaps in the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), and requiring gun 
manufacturers to “child-proof” guns.123 As of the beginning of 2009—after 
Heller—Brady’s website continued to push for expanding background checks, 
enacting policies to help law enforcement agencies to solve gun-related crimes, 
removing the Tiahrt Amendments, banning individuals on the terror watchlist 
from buying guns, and opposing laws that would expand individuals’ ability to 




 120 Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Dec. 26, 2008), http://www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20081226081323/http:// 
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml]. 
 121 State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Dec. 27, 2008), http://www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20081227010923/http:// 
www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml]. 
 122 State & Local Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20110902003337/http:// 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org:80/html/local/local.shtml] (describing the group’s state and local policy agenda); 
Federal Legislation, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS (July 23, 2011), http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns. 
org/html/federal/federal.shtml [https://web.archive.org/web/20110723121453/http://www. 
mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/html/federal/federal.shtml] (describing the group’s federal policy agenda). 
 123 State and Federal Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (June 26, 2007), http:// 
www.bradycampaign.org/legislation/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20070626051410/http://www.brady 
campaign.org/legislation/]. 
 124 State and Federal Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 18, 2009), http:// 
www.bradycampaign.org/legislation/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20090118014557/http://www.brady 
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emphasize expanded background checks and child safety measures, along with 
provisions to crack down on gun dealers who violate the law.125  
When considered together, the policy agendas of the three most prominent 
gun-regulation advocacy groups show little evidence of a Heller effect. In all 
three cases, this result is mostly because the groups’ pre-Heller agendas were 
relatively moderate and did not include policies that would have been affected 
by the Supreme Court’s decisions.  
B. Political Strategies of Pro-Gun Groups: Litigation 
Even if Heller and its progeny had little effect on pro-regulation 
organizations, it is possible that the rulings might have affected the strategies of 
pro-gun groups. We examine two strategies, selected because there is reason to 
believe that they would have been especially responsive to pro-gun-rights 
rulings.  
The first of these strategies is Second Amendment litigation. We expect that 
Heller and its progeny will have a positive effect on the use of litigation as a 
political strategy. Although less common than many other policy-reform 
strategies, litigation is commonly pursued by interest groups across the political 
and issue spectrum.126 The strategy’s popularity may stem in part from the fact 
that federal law provides tax preferences for nonprofit organizations that seek 
change through the courts. Legal defense funds and other public-interest 
litigation organizations may qualify as public charities under Section 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, entitling them to receive grants from charitable 
foundations and tax-deductible donations from individuals.127 By contrast, 
nonprofit groups whose primary strategy is legislative advocacy may not accept 
foundation grants (except in carefully supervised circumstances128), nor can 
individual donors take a tax deduction for their contributions. Nonprofit groups 
 
campaign.org/legislation/]. 
 125 Legislation, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www. 
bradycampaign.org/legislation/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20110113193840/http://www.bradycampaign. 
org/legislation/]. 
 126 JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 175–77 (3d ed. 1997); WALKER, supra note 25, at 
109; Paul M. Collins, Jr., Interest Groups in the Judicial Arena, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTEREST GROUP 
POLITICS 221 (M. Grossmann ed., 2014); Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, More of the Same: 
Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change, 45 J. POL. 351, 357 tbl.1 (1983). 
 127 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., LITIGATION BY IRC 501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS (1984); see also INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 526: CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (2019) [hereinafter PUB. NO. 526]; INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 4221-PF: COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 3 (2014) 
[hereinafter PUB. NO. 4221-PF]. 
 128 See PUB. NO. 4221-PF, supra note 127, at 5–8 (discussing expenditure responsibility).  
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whose primary mission is supporting candidates or parties, or otherwise 
influencing elections, cannot receive money from foundations; and private 
donations are not deductible and are publicly reportable (above a certain 
level).129 Thus, of the three major strategies for reforming public policy—
elections, advocacy, and litigation—litigation receives the most generous 
treatment under the law. Public policy creates a financial incentive structure for 
policy entrepreneurs to pursue social change through the courts.130 
For these reasons and others that are specific to the gun case, we expect 
Heller and its progeny’s feedback effect on the use of the litigation strategy to 
be positive. First, Heller and McDonald recognized a broad “new” individual 
right but did so in the context of fairly narrow rulings (striking down anomalous 
bans on handguns kept by law-abiding gun owners in the home).131 To put it 
bluntly, the cases produced landmark rulings that would have a direct effect on 
very few laws. This disconnect—a big precedent with few effects—would be 
expected to invite litigation to align the rulings’ impact with their symbolic 
import. Second, Heller was focused squarely on handgun bans; it mentioned a 
handful of other “presumptively” constitutional firearms laws in passing,132 but 
left many other gun laws unaddressed. In so doing, the ruling invited pro-gun 
litigants to see how expansively the courts would interpret Heller. Third, the 
Heller and McDonald decisions did not specify the level of scrutiny that courts 
should use in evaluating the constitutionality of gun laws. The level of scrutiny 
applied is critical to determining whether a law stands or falls. Thus, in addition 
to the law itself, gun groups might have pursued litigation to establish a level of 
scrutiny that would make gun regulations as difficult as possible for their 
defenders to justify as constitutional.  
To assess this litigation hypothesis, we compiled a dataset of state and 
federal cases in which a gun law was challenged on Second Amendment 
grounds. These cases included, for example, challenges to state and federal laws 
 
 129 PUB. NO. 526, supra note 127, at 6; PUB. NO. 4221-PF, supra note 127, at 6–7; FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CAMPAIGN GUIDE: CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 90 
(2014).  
 130 GOSS, supra note 25, at 131. 
 131 McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 
(2008). 
 132 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (noting that nothing in the opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the 
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions 
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”). The accompanying footnote states: “We identify these 
presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 
627 n.26.  
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barring certain categories of people (e.g., felons, domestic abusers, drug addicts) 
from possessing a firearm, challenges to state restrictions on the right to carry a 
concealed weapon in public, state gun licensing laws, firearm taxes, and place-
based restrictions on firearm use, among other issues. These cases were 
numerous, and given time constraints, we present data from three years: 2003 
(seven years before McDonald), 2010 (the year McDonald was decided), and 
2017 (seven years after McDonald).133 These three years encompassed 331 
cases. Figure 3 shows the trend, which as hypothesized represents a departure 
from the “null effects” narrative. There does seem to be a positive effect on 
Second Amendment litigation in the post-Heller legal environment. 
To the extent that the post-Heller litigation was brought by organizations on 
behalf of individuals, we would infer a feedback effect on organizational 
 
 133 NEXIS UNI, https://www.nexisuni.com (follow “Legal” hyperlink and select U.S. cases; search “Second 
Amendment challenge”; then under the timeline, enter “01/01/2003” into the start date and “12/31/2017” into 
the end date; then follow “Select multiple” hyperlink and select all federal cases and state cases at the appellate 
level). Cases are counted only once—that is, a case that moves through the district, appeals, and supreme courts 
would count as one case, not three. We have excluded “as applied” challenges, in which individuals convicted 
of gun law violations seek to overturn these convictions, or those that relied upon them, but not to overturn the 
law entirely. We also have excluded cases brought by individuals whose Second Amendment complaint 
constitutes an extraneous claim in a case brought on other grounds. 
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strategy and, perhaps, on resource allocation decisions. Because these lawsuits 
need to be financed, we likewise might infer that Heller and its progeny also had 
a feedback effect on funders interested in gun issues. Future research might 
investigate the degree of gun groups’ and funders’ engagement in this litigation.  
C. Frameworks of Gun Rights Discourse 
Although gun control groups did not agree with the Heller ruling, some gun 
control leaders thought it might contain a silver lining. By assuring law-abiding 
gun owners that their handguns were constitutionally protected, the thinking 
went, Heller and its progeny would remove the threat of confiscation and 
thereby calm political discourse.134 For decades, the NRA had relied on the 
“slippery slope” argument to create or dramatize policy threats, which proved 
successful in mobilizing gun owners into politics.135 To gun control groups, the 
slippery slope argument—that any modest proposal would put America on the 
road to tyranny—forestalled political bargaining and eliminated the possibility 
that lawmakers could enact reasonable gun legislation supported by polling 
majorities. If gun rights groups could no longer plausibly assert that legislation 
would lead to tyranny, perhaps the parties to the great American gun war could 
call a truce, and good-faith armistice talks could begin. 
Did Heller and progeny shift gun rights discourse by influencing the range 
of plausible claims? To assess this question, we coded uses of slippery-slope 
style arguments in editorials published in the NRA’s flagship magazine, 
American Rifleman. The examined editorials, typically written by the 
organization’s chief executive, cover a nine-year window (2004–2012) centered 
on 2008, when the Court decided Heller.136 As Figure 4 shows, there was a slight 
decline in threat rhetoric after Heller, and because we considered the entire 
population of editorials, this decline is not due to sampling error.  
 
 134 Helmke, supra note 19. 
 135 GOSS, supra note 79, at 172–73; Matthew J. Lacombe, The Political Weaponization of Gun Owners: 
The National Rifle Association’s Cultivation, Dissemination, and Use of a Group Social Identity, 81 J. POL. 
1342, 1353 (2019); Lacombe, supra note 25, at 142. 
 136 The Court issued its Heller ruling on June 26, 2008. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. American Rifleman first 
wrote about the ruling in the August 2008 issue. We coded each of the 108 editorials published from 2004 
through 2012 in terms of whether it argues that particular gun control policies or political outcomes (e.g., 
elections) will eventually lead to gun bans. We coded two different conceptions of gun bans. First, we focused 
on the use of slippery-slope arguments that end with universal bans on the ownership of guns—that is, the total 
elimination of the right to own firearms in the United States. Second, we focused on the use of slippery slope 
arguments that end with partial gun bans or additional controls on firearms that are more severe than those 
currently being debated. Each of the figures depicts the proportion of editorials published pre- and post-Heller 
that use these sorts of arguments; the figures include 95% confidence intervals. 
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However, even with the modest dip, the substantive takeaway is that the 
slippery slope argument remained a prominent framework. For years it had 
proved critical to the construction of a politicized gun owner identity.137 Part of 
this identity involved gun owners’ understanding of themselves as a besieged 
community.138 Policy threats to the gun owner identity had proved effective in 
mobilizing NRA members into politics.139 The court rulings did not 
fundamentally alter this dynamic.  
Using the same data, we examined more closely the substantive claims 
contained in the slippery-slope narrative. We ask: Where, according to the NRA, 
does this slippery slope eventually lead? Here we see a possible effect of Heller. 
As Figures 5 and 6 show, the editorials shifted from a claim that gun regulation 
would lead to a universal ban on firearms (the dominant pre-Heller framing) to 
a claim that gun regulation would lead to partial gun bans or other sorts of future 
restrictions (the dominant post-Heller framing).  
 
 137 Lacombe, supra note 25, at 22, 37. 
 138 Id. at 139–41. 
 139 Lacombe, supra note 135, at 1352–53. 
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Taken together, these figures suggest that the NRA updated its threat 
framework to accommodate the Heller and McDonald rulings. In the new 
discourse, there was perhaps a limit on how far the slippery slope could 
descend—but it remained slippery. Court rulings that might have undermined 
the political power of these mobilizing frameworks appear to have just 
reoriented the rhetoric toward slightly different types of policy threats. 
D. Organizational Capacity of Gun-Related Organizations 
Public policies can affect the capacity of organizations to engage in politics. 
Policies may expand or shrink organizations’ financial resources; provide or 
remove political opportunities for membership growth; or offer other goods such 
as data, access to convenings and networks, and authoritative validation.140 
Public policy has operated on or through gun-related groups via all of these 
mechanisms.141 Here, we consider financial and membership resources. 
To track the relative financial resources pre- and post-Heller, we examined 
the informational tax returns of three leading legislative advocacy organizations, 
organized under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, and their 
charitable affiliates, organized under Section 501(c)(3).142 These organizations 
were the NRA (and the NRA Foundation), the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun 
Violence (and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence), and the Coalition to 
Stop Gun Violence (and the Educational Fund to Stop Gun Violence). The 
Figure captures the combined revenue of the (c)(4) and the related (c)(3) for each 
entity. The NRA’s resources have been divided by ten to fit on the scale. 
 
 140 GOSS, supra note 79, at 73–90; Campbell, supra note 98, at 337; Mettler & SoRelle, supra note 24, at 
110–13; Mettler & Soss, supra note 24, at 62. See generally Goss, Barnes & Rose, supra note 25. 
 141 GOSS, supra note 79, at 73–90; SPITZER, supra note 92, at 132–34. 
 142 Nonprofit organizations recognized under Sections 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) that have normal annual 
revenues of at least $50,000 are required to file these informational tax returns, known as Form 990, each year. 
We obtained these forms from the online repository Guidestar.org (now Candid.org).  
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As the Figure shows, Heller appears to have had no discernible effect on 
organization revenues on either side of the gun debate. The flat or downward 
slope observed before Heller continued afterward.  
Of course, it is possible that these lines would have looked different in the 
absence of Heller. Perhaps the NRA’s revenues would have held steady longer 
instead of declining; perhaps the gun control groups’ revenues would have 
ticked up a bit. Such counterfactuals are unmeasurable and ultimately 
unknowable. That said, it is reasonable to infer from the data that if Heller had 
produced a major independent impact on organizational revenues, this effect 
must have been offset by one or more other major forces to produce the observed 
(largely flat) trend lines. If Heller mattered, what offsetting forces might have 
mattered enough to obscure the ruling’s effect? Two plausible possibilities 
present themselves: (1) the Great Recession and (2) the election of Democratic 
President Barack Obama and a Democratic Congress. Theory tells us that both 
events would have been expected to produce a positive effect on NRA revenues. 
Both the recession and the election of a unified Democratic government (headed 
by the first African-American president) were easily framed as threats to gun 
owner rights, which we would expect to produce increased revenues flowing to 
the NRA. Of course, the recession also reduced many people’s disposable 
GOSS&LACOMBE_8.27.20 8/27/2020 5:20 PM 
2020] HELLER AND THE LIMITS OF POLICY FEEDBACK 911 
income, which would have been expected to produce a revenue loss. Because 
NRA revenues declined not only during the worst of the recession, but also 
through 2012, when the worst of the recession was over, we feel confident in 
our conclusion that Heller had little if any effect on organizational revenues.  
The uptick in revenues occurred in 2012–2013, especially for the NRA but 
also for the two gun control groups. Press accounts suggest that these increases 
were the result of the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, which occurred 
in mid-December 2012.143 The shooting claimed the lives of twenty first-graders 
and six educators, traumatized and mobilized gun control sympathizers, and 
pushed gun policy reform to the top of the congressional agenda, as well as that 
of many state legislatures.144 While organizational-revenue data presented here 
do not allow for a fine-grained analysis, the patterns are consistent with 
Rosenberg’s conclusion that litigation is a less potent force than politics in 
spurring political participation. 
A second measure of organizational capacity is membership. Membership is 
valuable because lawmakers are accountable to voters for their jobs and thus are 
attentive to organizations that can mobilize large numbers of people.145 Mass 
membership organizations also have played a key role in influencing the 
development and passage of major social legislation.146 Indeed, organizations 
frequently cite the size of their membership and its policy sophistication to 
establish their authority before lawmakers.147 However, in many policy 
domains, mass membership organizations have faded, giving way to interest 
groups led by professionals without an organized grassroots base.148 Thus, 
 
 143 Alana Abramson, Membership in Gun Groups Is Spiking After the Florida Shooting, TIME (Mar. 2, 
2018, 4:20 PM), https://time.com/5176471/national-rifle-association-membership-florida-shooting/; Maggie 
Astor, Newtown Wasnʼt an End for Gun Control. It Was a Beginning., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/newtown-parkland-guns.html. See generally Kristin A. Goss, 
Whatever Happened to the ‘Missing Movement’? Gun Control Politics Over Two Decades of Change, in GUN 
STUDIES: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO POLITICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 136 (Jennifer Carlson, Kristin 
A. Goss & Harel Shapira eds., 2018). 
 144 Reid Wilson, Seven Years After Sandy Hook, Politics of Guns Has Changed, HILL (Dec. 14, 2019, 6:00 
AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/474479-seven-years-after-sandy-hook-the-politics-of-guns-
has-changed. 
 145 Jeff Stein, The NRA Is a Powerful Political Force—But Not Because of Its Money, VOX (Oct. 5, 2017, 
1:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/5/16430684/nra-congress-money-no. See 
generally GOSS, supra note 25. 
 146 EDWIN AMENTA, WHEN MOVEMENTS MATTER: THE TOWNSEND PLAN AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY 24 (2006); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 76 (1992). 
 147 GOSS, supra note 25, at 26. 
 148 Id. at 156; THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN 
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 199–200 (2003). 
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organizations that can retain and mobilize a mass base have political advantages. 
Recent research has shown, for example, that lawmakers afford outsized 
deference to citizens who show up and make noise, even if they do not represent 
the median voter in the lawmaker’s district.149 Thus, if court rulings are capable 
of influencing the size or enthusiasm of an organization’s membership, they 
could have potentially important policy feedback effects.  
With respect to Heller and related rulings, assessing the feedback effects on 
membership capacity is complicated. To our knowledge, there is no consistent, 
valid, and reliable measure of membership in gun control groups over time. This 
deficiency relates to the observation above that many organizations have moved 
from a model of influence based on mass memberships to a model based on 
professional experts funded by elite donors—what Theda Skocpol terms the 
evolution from “membership to management.”150 However, this insight gives us 
confidence that the financial trends presented above accurately capture the 
Heller effect on gun control groups’ “membership”—in this case, the non-effect. 
On the gun rights side, the data are more accessible. Members of the NRA 
are allowed to choose one of the organization’s official magazines to receive as 
a benefit of membership.151 Magazine subscriptions are reported to the Alliance 
for Audited Media (AAM).152 The Alliance certifies magazine-circulation 
figures for the benefit of advertisers, who typically pay rates based on the 
number of potential readers the ad might reach and thus need assurance that the 
readership figures are accurate. The AAM makes magazines’ aggregate 
circulation figures publicly available. In the case of the NRA, these circulation 
figures provide a reasonable proxy for total membership. Likewise, the trends in 
total NRA magazine subscriptions provide a reasonable proxy for the trends in 
NRA membership. 
 
 149 David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion Among Political 
Elites, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 542, 544 (2018); Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Matto Mildenberger & Leah C. 
Stokes, Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 (2019). 
 150 SKOCPOL, supra note 148, at 127. 
 151 Membership, NRA, https://membership.nra.org/MultiStep/Joins?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIq4SSzLDP5w 
IVzJ6zCh31-wppEAAYASAAEgI22vD_BwE (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
There were three magazines through mid-2016—American Rifleman, American Hunter, and America’s 
1st Freedom. In mid-2016, the NRA added a fourth selection—Shooting Illustrated. The circulation totals in 
Figure 8 count subscriptions to Shooting Illustrated in 2017 and 2018, but not in 2016, when the magazine was 
new and had not been adopted by many members. That said, the total 2016 magazine circulation figure might 
slightly underestimate the NRA’s membership in that year.  
 152 Who We Are, ALLIANCE FOR AUDITED MEDIA, https://auditedmedia.com/about/who-we-are (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
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Figure 8 shows NRA magazine circulation figures from 1999–2017—a 
period that encompasses roughly a decade before and a decade after the Heller 
and McDonald rulings.153 The pattern is ambiguous. The uptick in membership 
after 2008 (corresponding with Heller) is consistent with a Heller effect, a 
recession effect, and/or an Obama/Democratic takeover effect. The dip in 2011–
2012 is also consistent with each explanation—the recession was fading, Obama 
was not making any moves on gun control, and Heller had not sparked the sort 
of political controversy that causes people to join advocacy groups. The post-
2011 pattern, in particular the 2013 (post-Sandy Hook) and 2018 (post-Parkland) 
jumps in membership are consistent with the effects of mass shootings on gun 
politics.  
To summarize, Heller’s timing—in the midst of a great recession and an 
especially consequential national election—makes it hard to assess its 
independent effect on organizational memberships. Besides being unfriendly to 
control advocates, Heller was not especially helpful to empirical social scientists 
seeking to understand the feedback effects of court decisions on politics. Our 
assessment is that Heller was reassuring to gun owners. Accustomed to 
 
 153 We are grateful to Michael Siegel, of Boston University’s School of Public Health, for sharing these 
NRA magazine circulation figures with us. 
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mobilizing based on policy or identity threats, this affirmational ruling probably 
had little impact on gun owners’ political participation. Threats posed by 
focusing events and electoral shifts likely mattered more. 
Like Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s 
two gun cases—Heller and McDonald—involved a salient social issue easily 
understood by the mass public. Gun control had been the topic of intense 
political conflict at least since the 1960s.154 The decade leading up to Heller had 
included the mass shooting at Columbine High School (1999), the largest ever 
public demonstration for gun control (the Million Mom March, 2000), and the 
massacre of students and instructors at Virginia Tech (at that time, the deadliest 
such incident in American history, 2007). Aside from the political ramifications, 
Heller and McDonald had the potential to affect a broad swath of the population. 
In 2008, an estimated 35% of American households had a firearm of some type, 
and about 20% had a handgun—whose prohibition by the D.C. government was 
at issue in Heller.155 In sum, the gun cases stood out from the more common 
types of Supreme Court cases, which involve narrow, technical matters of 
concern only to small policy communities. 
We lack a consistent, reliable measure of mass-level participation around 
gun regulation. However, polling organizations have asked generic questions 
aimed at assessing individuals’ posture toward the gun issue. For example, for 
many years, the Pew Research Center asked: “What do you think is more 
important—to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR to control gun 
ownership?”156 Figure 9 shows the percentage of respondents who prioritized 
gun control, broken down by political party identification. As the Figure 
suggests, pro-control sentiment had started to decline before the Heller ruling 
was announced, in June 2008 (indicated by the vertical line). And the decline 
did not visibly accelerate afterward. 
 
 154 GOSS, supra note 79, at 29. 
 155 Figures generated by authors from the General Social Survey’s online data tool, GSS DATA EXPLORER, 
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/trends/Civil%20Liberties?measure=owngun (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
 156 2014 Political Polarization Survey, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), https://www.people-press.org/ 
2014/06/12/gun-rightsgun-control/. 
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The Gallup Organization’s version of the generic question asks: “In general, 
do you feel that the laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more 
strict, less strict, or kept as they are now?”157 The trend lines show no disruption 
in 2008. In the years preceding Heller, there had been a gradual erosion in the 
fraction of Americans wanting stricter laws and a concomitant rise in the fraction 
wanting the status quo; the fraction wanting less strict laws was low (generally 
5–10%) and stable.158 These data are consistent with the other evidence 
suggesting that the court rulings did not alter mass politics. 
V. COURTS, CHANGE, AND A CAVEAT  
When taken together, our findings indicate that the effects of the landmark 
Heller ruling have, at least to date, been rather limited. Together with McDonald, 
the Heller ruling did lead to the repeal of some of the country’s most restrictive 
handgun laws. Although these changes were significant, their effects were 
geographically narrow, pertaining only to Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and 
the Chicago area.159 Beyond the direct effects of the rulings on existing gun 
policies, we also examined these rulings’ impacts on three main categories of 
outcomes: (1) other handgun laws and policymaker agendas; (2) the political 
capacity and strategies of pro- and anti-gun advocacy organizations; and (3) 
 
 157 Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 158 Id. 
 159 See supra Part III. 
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mass attitudes about gun control. With the exception of gun rights litigation, we 
find that the rulings had either miniscule or non-existent impacts on the political 
and social outcomes we examined.160 Neither the hopes, nor the worries, of 
advocates have borne out.  
Our findings support the constrained view of the Court advanced by 
Rosenberg. Notably, however, Rosenberg builds his argument around cases that 
progressives hoped would spur widespread change.161 Our analysis, on the other 
hand, focuses on a pair of cases that conservatives hoped would drive broader 
changes aligned with their beliefs. In finding that the conservative victories 
delivered by the Heller and McDonald cases were mostly symbolic, our 
conclusion validates Rosenberg’s basic claim—that courts are poor substitutes 
for politics as engines of change—but also suggests that hollow hopes may 
bedevil conservatives as well as progressives.162  
Our findings are consistent with other work finding that courts are cautious 
about getting too far out in front of public opinion.163 Such caution is logical 
insofar as courts, lacking both sword and purse, typically must rely on moral 
suasion to ensure compliance with their rulings. The Heller and McDonald 
rulings affected laws that were generally out of step with U.S. public opinion.164 
If court rulings are lagging indicators of broader political dynamics, there is 
reason to expect that courts will have muted feedback effects on politics writ 
large. The effect of Heller and its progeny was noticeable only in the realm of 
litigation and to a small extent in NRA rhetoric. Regarding litigation, the rulings 
appeared to encourage more Second Amendment challenges to gun regulations, 
but most of these challenges were unsuccessful.165 The feedback effect on 
litigation was predictable, narrowly defined, and not especially meaningful in 
terms of producing social change.166 Regarding NRA rhetoric, the rulings led to 
minor semantic adjustments only; the longstanding slippery-slope argument 
remained a trusty weapon in the organization’s political arsenal.167 
 
 160 See supra Part V. 
 161 See supra Part II. 
 162 See supra Part II. 
 163 Christopher J. Casillas, Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, How Public Opinion Constrains the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 75 (2011).  
 164 See supra Part III. 
 165 See supra Part V.B. 
 166 See supra Part V.B. 
 167 See supra Part V.C. 
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Beyond these minor exceptions, the pro-gun rulings had undetectable 
feedback effects. The rulings appeared to produce no meaningful changes in the 
resources or strategies of gun control organizations, which had long since 
adjusted to the same forces weighing on the Court, or on the strategies of 
lawmakers, who presumably also had bent to the shifting realities of gun 
politics.168 The NRA did not receive a detectable Heller bounce in members or 
revenue. In addition, the rulings had little effect on public opinion, which was a 
leading indicator of the pro-gun drift in American politics. By 2008, the zone of 
political conflict over guns had become demarcated in such a way as to sideline 
older disputes over draconian gun bans.169 This development arguably gave the 
Court the political space to issue its landmark rulings without fear of backlash 
or broad resistance. A corollary to the Court’s having such political space is that 
the rulings’ feedback effects would probably be minimal to nil.  
Interestingly, gun rights advocates have grown alarmed by Heller and 
progeny’s minimal effects on gun law and politics. The NRA and conservative 
legal activists are frustrated that in their view the courts have treated the Second 
Amendment as a “second-class right”—a phrase first used by Justice Clarence 
Thomas referring to the lack of post-Heller rulings striking down gun laws based 
on the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.170 The conservatives’ position 
is that Heller should have set off a cascade of pro-gun rulings and, presumably, 
accelerated a political shift favoring the gun-rights movement.171 Such 
frustrations reinforce the conclusion that courts may offer a hollow hope to 
reformers not only on the left, but also on the right. 
On a broader level, our findings connect the scholarly literature on policy 
feedback to the study of courts. In so doing, this case study suggests that—like 
other forms of public policy—court rulings may have a limited role in reshaping 
politics. Political actors (including activists, politicians, and party officials) 
seeking to advance a policy agenda and build durable political power can thus 
learn from Heller. The case reminds us that despite courts’ attractiveness as 
agents of change amid legislative gridlock and polarization, they may not be 
strong substitutes for more traditional forms of political influence. 
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We end with an important caveat. As we concluded this Article, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the case of New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. City 
of New York, which had challenged a New York City law that had strictly 
regulated the transportation of handguns.172 After the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case, the city repealed the law in hopes of curtailing Court review; this 
move led the Court to rule that the case had become moot.173 Although the 
Court’s restraint in this case aligns with the argument we have made throughout 
this Article, the ruling nonetheless leaves the door open to future cases. Writing 
in dissent, Justice Samuel Alito—joined by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Clarence 
Thomas—made clear that the Court should consider future challenges to gun 
regulations on Second Amendment grounds.174 Moreover, Justice Brett 
Kavanagh—despite agreeing with the majority about the case’s mootness—
wrote separately to express his openness to future challenges.175 Subsequent 
rulings, therefore, could call into question the constitutionality of common state 
and local laws, such as those that give law enforcement discretion in granting 
concealed-carry licenses. Indeed, it is possible that future court rulings that 
threaten longstanding gun control laws or open the door to gun liberalization 
could produce the sorts of feedback effects that have gone largely undetected 
thus far.  
 
 172 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020). 
 173 Id.; Robert Barnes, New York Eased Gun Law Hopeful Supreme Court Would Drop Second Amendment 
Case—but that Hasn’t Happened Yet, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/courts_law/new-york-eased-gun-law-hopeful-supreme-court-would-drop-second-amendment-
case—but-that-hasnt-happened-yet/2019/08/10/9031682e-bab6-11e9-a091-6a96e67d9cce_story.html. 
 174 Robert Barnes, Supreme Court dismisses anticipated New York gun rights case because the law in 
question has been rescinded, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 5:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
courts_law/supreme-court-dismisses-anticipated-new-york-gun-rights-case-because-the-law-in-question-has-
been-rescinded/2020/04/27/d05c39e6-8893-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html 
 175 Id. 
